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The definition of negligence in the draft Restatement (Third)
of Torts: General Principles (Discussion Draft) ("Discussion Draft")
employs a version of the Learned Hand formula. According to the
chief Reporter, Professor Gary Schwartz, who is responsible for this
draft, the Hand formula can accommodate both economic and fair-
ness accounts of negligence law.
Is he correct? I will argue that he is, and that the Hand for-
mula, suitably defined and explained, is indeed an appropriate gen-
eral criterion for negligence. At the same time, however, the current
Discussion Draft is deficient in some respects. It does not ade-
quately allay the fears of those who worry that the Hand formula
will inevitably receive a narrow economic interpretation. It should
more clearly underscore that negligence is a species of fault. And it
should clarify the unavoidable value judgments inherent in a negli-
gence determination, value judgments that are no less necessary or
desirable when the Hand formula is employed to make that deter-
mination. At the end of this Paper, I suggest some specific Restate-
ment language that might remedy these deficiencies.
I. THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT'S DEFINITION OF NEGLIGENCE
Section 4 of the Discussion Draft defines "negligent" in terms
of the Learned Hand factors:'
An actor is negligent in engaging in conduct if the actor does not exercise reason-
able care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining
whether conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will
result in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the bur-
den that would be borne by the actor and others if the actor takes precautions that
eliminate or reduce the possibility of harm.2
According to the comments that immediately follow, the Re-
porter intended this definition to have the same meaning as a "rea-
sonably careful person" test.3 Moreover, the definition is meant to
have some flexibility: while the listed "primary" factors explain the
1. Under the Learned Hand test, an actor is negligent if "B < (P x L)," where "B" refers to
the burden of taking a precaution, 'P" to the probability of a loss if the precaution is not taken,
and "L" to the magnitude of such a loss. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 4 (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,
1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
3. Id. § 4 cmt. a.
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content of reasonable care in "the typical case," sometimes other
"considerations or circumstances" will "supplement or somewhat
subordinate the primary factors."4 Examples where this may occur
include emergencies, actors who are children, actors with disabili-
ties, and inadvertent negligence. 5
The Discussion Draft offers a catholic and nondogmatic
characterization of the Hand test, suggesting that "risk-benefit,"
"cost-benefit," and "balancing" are all acceptable descriptions be-
cause they all express the "simple idea" that "[c]onduct is negligent
if its disadvantages exceed its advantages."6 So stated, this "simple
idea" verges on the vacuous.7 But the Discussion Draft goes on to
explain that "disadvantages" encompass the foreseeable likelihood
and severity of harm, while "advantages" means the avoided bur-
dens of risk prevention (i.e., burdens that would be incurred if the
actor did take a precaution against the risk of harm). Moreover,
those burdens "can take a wide variety of forms," including: finan-
cial burdens, delays experienced by motorists' reducing their speed,
inconvenience, inability to satisfy a friend's need (for example, if
one declines to lend a car to a friend who is a bad driver), and the
possible creation of new risks of injury.8
Other comments helpfully explain the following points:
(a) All three primary factors are relevant to the question whether
the actor is negligent. Thus, it can be negligent to create even a
low-level risk (where the probability of injury is low, or where
the injury if it occurs will not be severe), and reasonable to cre-
ate even a high-level risk.9
(b) Determining whether the actor should have "reasonably fore-
seen" a risk sometimes requires a balancing of factors (namely,
the advantages and disadvantages of gathering information)
similar to the balancing that the negligence test itself entails.10
4. Id. § 4 cmt. c.
5. In this last case, the Discussion Draft concludes, "the reasonably careful person" test is
preferable. Id. § 4 cmt. k. For further discussion, see infra notes 105.09 and accompanying text.
6. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. k.
7. Similarly, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. a (1965), pithily asserts: "The
problem involved may be expressed in homely terms by asking whether 'the game is worth the
candle.'"; see also Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 931.
934 (2000) (noting that any "pro" and "anti" arguments associated with a proposal can be trans-
lated into "benefit' and "cost" language).
8. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 4. Other examples of burdens are the risk that crimi-
nals will escape (if police do not conduct a high-speed chase), and interference with privacy (if a
hospital asks blood donors about their sexual orientation). Id.
9. Id. § 4 cmt. e.
10. Id. § 4 cmt. E
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(c) The decisionmaker should consider all foreseeable harms that a
precaution would minimize, and not just the type of harm suf-
fered by the plaintiff.1'
(d) The focus should be on the marginal advantages and disadvan-
tages of taking a particular precaution. Thus, failure to take a
precaution can constitute negligence even if the precaution
would only have reduced, rather than eliminated, the risk.12
(e) In analyzing whether the actor should have taken a precaution,
the test calls for an ex ante, not an ex post, judgment. 13
(f) Sometimes one is negligent simply for choosing to engage in an
unduly risky activity when there is no realistic way that one can
both engage in the activity and reduce its risks. 14
Finally, and critically, the Discussion Draft explains that the
balancing test can be justified both "in fairness terms as remedying
an injustice inflicted on the plaintiff by the defendant," and "also
. . . as a measure for providing the defendant with safety incen-
tives."15
11. Id. § 4 cmt. g.
12. Id. § 4 cmt. h. However, I question the assertion in Section 4, Reporter's Note, that
courts reject the following type of "refined" marginal precaution argument. Id. Suppose: (a) tho
defendant concedes that its level of precaution was inadequate (e.g., it failed to fence a golf
course); (b) marginal analysis supports a moderate precaution (e.g. a fifty foot fence) but not a
superprecaution (e.g. a 100-foot fence); and (c) only the superprecaution would actually prevent
the injury suffered by the victim. The Reporter's Note concludes that a court would find such a
defendant negligent even though marginal analysis would not support this result. Id. The Note
suggests that a court would evaluate the marginal benefits and burdens by comparing the actual
level of precaution (no fence) to the superprecaution that would assist the victim, even though
the superprecaution is more than a negligence standard would demand. Here the Note does not
cite any case support, but refers approvingly to Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory
of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799 (1983).
I agree that this type of detailed information about marginal precautions and their causal of.
fects is normally unavailable. But when it is available, it should be relevant, and I believe that a
court would consider it. Thus, suppose the following scenario. A motorist is speeding 45 miles
per hour in a 30 mph zone. Coming around a curve, he runs over a drunk person sleeping on the
street. The accident could not have been avoided by traveling at the speed limit, but could have
been avoided by driving 15 mph. Suppose that (in terms of the Hand factors), driving 15 mph is
preferable to driving 45 mph, but driving 30 mph is preferable to driving 15 mph. If the motorist
really could show that driving 30 mph would not have prevented the accident, I would be sur-
prised if a court would find him negligent. Although it might be appropriate to shift the burden
of proof to the defendant in this type of case, I believe that the defendant should prevail if ho
satisfies that burden.
13. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 4 cmt. g.
14. Id. § 4 cmt. i. As the tort literature explains, one can be negligent in selecting a par-
ticular level of activity even if one is not negligent in selecting a particular level of care, i.e., even
if there is no reasonable precaution that the actor could take that would permit him to engage in
the same level of activity, but more safely. See id.
15. Id. § 4 cmt. j.
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Thus, the Discussion Draft purports to offer a sufficiently
general criterion of negligence to accommodate quite different justi-
fications of negligence liability. Does it succeed? Or is the criterion
a thinly disguised invitation to courts to adopt a reductionist, eco-
nomic efficiency approach? I will argue that the language of §4, and
all of the features described in points (a) through (f), are consistent
with understanding negligence in either fairness or efficiency
terms.
II. NEGLIGENCE AND FAULT
Before addressing that issue, it is worth emphasizing a fun-
damental point. The Draft clearly understands negligence as a spe-
cies of fault-of deficient conduct. Although negligent conduct is
ordinarily the least serious or culpable form of fault, relative to
reckless conduct and unjustified intentional torts, it is most assur-
edly a form of fault. If this were not the case, negligence doctrine
would not focus on the precaution that the actor should have
taken 16 and on the actor's failure to act as a reasonable person
would have acted. From this perspective, although compensation is
an appropriate remedy for victims injured because of the actor's
fault, such liability does not serve merely as a pricing mechanism.
It is not the case that a negligent actor may omit a precaution so
long as he is willing to pay for the consequences of his neglect;
rather, it would be better if the negligent actor had taken the pre-
caution in the first place. 17
Moreover, the Discussion Draft emphasizes that a negligence
judgment should be made from the perspective of foresight, not
hindsight. Section 4 clarifies that the negligence judgment is a
judgment of ex ante fault, and that such fault often consists of
making improper tradeoffs in choosing among alternative courses of
action.
Finally, consistent with this understanding of negligence as
fault, tort law sharply distinguishes between negligence liability
and strict liability. The very recent Discussion Draft provisions on
strict liability draw this distinction quite clearly. Thus, comment a
to proposed Section 18 on strict liability for animals indicates that
16. Id. § 4 cmt. h (noting that the party alleging negligence must identify "a precaution that
should have been adopted").
17. See, e.g., ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAv 143 (1995); Kenneth W. Simons,
Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and Reformulation, 15 HARV. J.L
& PUB. POLY 849, 868-69 (1992).
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"[n]egligence is an obvious form of 'fault' while "strict liability sig-
nifies liability without fault, or at least without any proof of
fault."'18 Moreover, under the proposed test of strict liability for ab-
normally dangerous activities, one necessary prerequisite of liabil-
ity is the existence of a residual, substantial risk of injury even if
all actors exercise reasonable care. 19 Under this test, strict liability
is actually defined in contradistinction to negligence. And the Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability also distinguishes
between manufacturing defects, for which genuine strict liability is
imposed, and design and warning defects, for which negligence li-
ability is in effect imposed.20
Although the Draft commentary does discuss reasonable care
and precautions, greater emphasis on the need to prove the actor's
fault and also his failure to take a reasonable precaution (especially
in the Restatement's black letter provision) would be helpful. The
Appendix contains some suggested language to this end.21
III. THE DRAFT NEGLIGENCE CRITERION AND ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY
The negligence criterion elucidated in Section 4 of the Draft
could easily be misunderstood to express only an economic effi-
ciency approach, notwithstanding the explicit statement in the
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 18 (Preliminary Draft No.
2, May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft No. 2].
19. Id. § 21(B):
An activity is abnormally dangerous if:
(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly significant risk of physical
harm even when reasonable care is exercised by all actors; and
(2) the activity is not a matter of common usage.
See also id. § 21(B) cmt. j ('[This section sets forth a rule of strict liability, not of negligence
liability, and accordingly rests on the assumption that the advantages of engaging in the activity
are in fact substantial enough to render reasonable the defendant's choice to engage in the ac-
tivity.").
20. For a helpful articulation of this point, see David Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Explod-
ing the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743. I say "in effect' because, for a
variety of reasons, the Discussion Draft is hesitant to unambiguously categorize design and
warning defects as instances of negligence liability. The test for design defects does, however,
emphasize that the plaintiff must ordinarily identify a reasonable alternative design, and the
test for warning defects emphasizes that the plaintiff must show the inadequacy of the existing
warning and the efficacy of a proposed alternative. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 2 (1998) cmts. d, f, i [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY]. Further, comment a to Sec-
tion 2 explains that the design and warning defect standards "achieve the same general objec-
tives as does liability predicated on negligence." Id. § 2 cmt. a.
21. As we will see shortly, however, an economic efficiency approach might not be consistent
with the fundamental understanding of negligence as deficient, faulty conduct.
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comments that fairness as well as safety incentives can justify the
criterion. For the Hand test of negligence, which the criterion
closely resembles, 22 has indeed often been invoked-one is tempted
to say "adopted," with parental pride and love-by academics inter-
ested in applying economic analysis to negligence law.2
But the assumption that the Hand test must be identified
with economic efficiency analysis is unfounded. The basic Hand
formula requires balancing, at the margin, the foreseeable advan-
tages and disadvantages of taking a precaution. The disadvantages
might be understood, however, to include only the socially recog-
nized burdens of taking a precaution (of the sort noted in the Dis-
cussion Draft's comments). Likewise, the advantages can be under-
stood to include the socially recognized benefits of taking a precau-
tion, especially the benefit of reducing a range of foreseeable inju-
ries that would otherwise occur. As we will see below, the Hand test
is consistent with many very different conceptions of which burdens
and benefits should be legally recognized, and of how they should be
valued. Economic efficiency is only one of these conceptions.
What explains the common assumption that the Hand for-
mula is necessarily, and not merely contingently, associated with
economic efficiency analysis? Apart from the historical fact that
many prominent law and economics scholars have championed the
Hand formula, three explanations seem important. First, judgments
of negligence often depend on the actor having made an improper
tradeoff among interests that weigh in opposite directions. Insofar
as "economic analysis," at the most general level, addresses any
choice among competing values in circumstances of scarcity, it
might seem that the Hand test necessarily expresses economic effi-
22. The Reporter's Note explicitly identifies the Hand test as "[a] famous exposition of the
balancing approach." Id. § 2 cmt. g. The Note also points out that "Judge Hand recognized the
problems of quantifiability and incommensurability" in applying the test. Id.
23. See, e.g., DAVID NV. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND
ECONOMICS 93-104 (1992); WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNoAc
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 85-107 (1987); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 29, 32 (1972); see also Gregory Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 331-36 (1996). For examples of critics of the economic efficiency
approach who view the Hand formula as inextricably linked with efficiency, see VEINI, supra
note 17, at 148-50; Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking And he Torts Revolution. The Re-
venge Of The Ordinary Observer, 26 GA. L. REV. 725, 734-37 (1992); Richard Wright The Stan-
dard of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LW 249 (David G.
Owen ed., 1995). By contrast, Michael Green finds the linkage more contingent, acknowledging
that the Hand formula "can also be understood noninstrumentally to reflect the Golden Rule"
Michael Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts > 75 TMX L, REv. 1605, 1614 (1997).
Still, Green's account frequently equates the Hand formula with economic efficiency. See id. at
1625, 1627.
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ciency. Second, any test of negligence, insofar as it expresses an ex
ante judgment about the advantages and disadvantages of taking
precaution against risk of future injury, is inevitably concerned
with consequences in some sense. But then it is assumed that any
test of negligence must be "consequentialist" in a deeper sense, in
the sense of a moral or legal theory that judges the rightness or
goodness of an act or practice solely by the aggregate consequences
of that act or practice. Third, the Hand formula is often understood
to embody a reductionist approach to balancing, one in which the
interests to be balanced are valued according to a simple common
measure such as wealth or utility, so that the actor ideally would
literally "calculate" the relevant costs and benefits.
Each of these assumptions is false, as I will explain. Moreo-
ver, to underscore this point, Part IV will explicate several norma-
tive understandings of negligence other than economic efficiency
that are consistent with a Hand balancing test.
A. Distinguishing Tradeoffs from Economic Efficiency
It is true that "economics," in its most general sense, is the
study of tradeoffs of resources or interests in circumstances of scar-
city. But the economic efficiency approach to negligence is much
more specific: it means wealth-maximization, or at least a tractable
version of utilitarian preference-satisfaction. A balancing approach
to negligence that explicitly considers tradeoffs can indeed accom-
modate an economic efficiency approach. As we shall see, however,
it can also accommodate broader social welfare and nonutilitarian
approaches, though these other approaches will trade off different
competing interests and values, or will trade them off differently.
To be sure, some nonconsequentialists endorse absolute
norms, norms that do not permit balancing of competing interests
or values. 24 But nonconsequentialists need not be committed to ab-
24. See, e.g., ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977); Heidi Hurd, The Deontology
of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 252-54 (1996); Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157, 161-63 (1994).
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solutism, 25 and in the particular context of negligence, such abso-
lutism is highly implausible. 26
B. Distinguishing Ex Ante Balancing from Consequentialism
The second misunderstanding is that any ex ante balance of
the foreseeable advantages and disadvantages of taking a precau-
tion expresses a form of consequentialism, and thus is inconsistent
with a deontological, fairness, or corrective justice account of negli-
gence.27 This misunderstanding flows from two confusions.
The first confusion is between ex ante analysis and conse-
quentialist moral theory. Specifically, from the fact that ex ante,
marginal analysis necessarily involves predicting the possible fu-
ture consequences of taking a precaution, one might mistakenly
conclude that such an analysis is consequentialist in a morally im-
portant sense-in the sense captured by the distinction in moral
and political theories between consequentialist and deontological
theories. That distinction contrasts two fundamentally different
ways of understanding what duties people have-either a conse-
quentialist duty (often described as agent-neutral) to bring about
the best possible consequences for human welfare, or a deontologi-
cal duty (often described as agent-relative) of an agent not to vio-
late another's rights or not to commit a wrong.2 Thus, a deontolo-
gist might categorically object to blaming or punishing an innocent
person, even if blaming or punishing that person would have good
consequences, while a consequentialist would view the empirical
consequences as decisive.2 9 In the legal realm, consequentialist
25. See, e.g., F.M. Kamm, Nonconsequentialism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO ETHICAL
THEORY 206, 218-19 (Hugh LaFollette ed.. 2000); see also SHELLY KAGAN, NORMIATIVE ETHICS 73
(1998) ("[D]eontologists need not actually be absolutists about their rules; and, at any rate, con-
sequentialists are absolutists: they are absolutists with regard to the requirement to do the act
with the best results.").
26. See Kenneth W. Simons, Deonlology, Negligence Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273,
293-94 (1996).
27. I will employ the term "fairness" generically for any noneconomic and nonutilitarian ac-
count of tort law. Obviously, this category can encompass numerous different corrective justice,
fairness, deontological, and distributive justice views.
28. For some discussions, see KAGAN, supra note 25, at 70-78; THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW
FROM NOWHERE 164-66 (1986); Kamm, supra note 25, at 205-07.
29. See KAGAN, supra note 25, at 70-78; Kamm, supra note 25, at 215-18. Another classic
example of the distinction is an agent intentionally harming an innocent person in order to pre-
vent someone else from intentionally harming several persons. Many deontologists would object
to such an action, while a consequentialist might approve. Some deontologists, however, would
countenance a rule that defines primary wrongs in deontological terms, but then permits a con-
2001] 909
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theories include utilitarianism and its economic variants, while
deontological theories include corrective justice and fairness theo-
ries of tort law and retributivist theories of criminal law.
But ex ante, marginal analysis of the duty to take a precau-
tion is not necessarily consequentialist in this fundamental sense.
Just because a criterion of fault finds some consequences of a per-
son's act to be relevant to whether he is at fault, it does not follow
that the criterion is fundamentally consequentialist, in the sense
that the rightness of the act depends only on a consideration of
whether the act produces the best aggregate consequences. 0 Con-
sider murder, the intentional and unjustified killing of another hu-
man being. Both deontological and consequentialist theories can
justify treating murder as a serious wrong, though for different rea-
sons. Now consider attempted murder. If a person fires a gun with
the intention of killing his victim, but misses, he is also seriously at
fault. And this result can be defended either under a deontological
theory (assessing which acts justly deserve the most retributive
blame) or under a consequentialist theory (assessing which acts are
sufficiently dangerous that they are especially worth deterring).
But notice that, on either theory, our judgment that the attempted
killer is seriously at fault depends in significant part on the poten-
tial consequences of his acts. He is seriously at fault not just be-
cause he has performed an unjustified act (firing the gun at the vic-
tim), but because he has done so with the intention of bringing
about a very harmful future consequence (the death of the victim).
Yet it hardly follows that the retributivist assessment of blame for
attempted murder is just a disguised form of "consequentialism"31
in the more fundamental sense.
sequentialist policy of minimizing such wrongs. E.g., Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivisn,
27 ISRAEL L. REV. 15, 17-19 (1993) (describing how a retributivist can be consequontialist and
support a policy of punishing one defendant less than he justly deserves if that defendant assists
the prosecutor in assuring that other defendants obtain their just deserts). In the text that fol.
lows, I discuss the analogous possibility of "truncating" a utilitarian approach, thus endorsing
only a utilitarian criterion of primary fault or only a utilitarian reason for imposing liability.
30. Kamm provides a helpful general criterion:
Nonconsequentialism is a normative ethical theory which denies that the right-
ness or wrongness of our conduct is determined solely by the goodness or bad-
ness of the consequences of our acts or the rules to which those acts conform. It
does not deny that consequences can be a factor in determining the rightness of
an act. It does insist that even when the consequences of two acts or act-types
are the same, one might be wrong and the other right.
Kamm, supra note 25, at 205.
31. See Simons, supra note 26, at 285; Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 SOC. PHIL. &
POL. 52, 76 (1999).
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The second confusion results from a failure to appreciate
that any justification for imposing negligence liability on an actor
hinges on two independent issues: (1) the reason for concluding that
the actor is at fault, and (2) the reason for imposing liability on a
faulty actor. A fully consequentialist theory such as utilitarianism
provides consequentialist reasons at both levels; what we might call
a "truncated" consequentialist theory provides a consequentialist
reason at only one.32 This confusion is potentially troublesome. For
even if the actor's fault at level (1) is determined by a genuinely
consequentialist analysis (and not just by a consequentialist analy-
sis in the specious sense just discussed, of an ex ante evaluation of
some of the expected advantages and disadvantages of taking the
action), such a consequentialist criterion of fault might not support
a full-fledged consequentialist justification of tort liability.
Consider a truncated utilitarian approach that is utilitarian
at level (1) but not at level (2). At level (1), the approach under-
stands fault as inefficient conduct, i.e. conduct that fails to maxi-
mize utility. At level (2), however, suppose the reason for imposing
liability on such an actor is neither utilitarian nor instrumental;
there is no assumption that faulty actors should compensate their
victims in order to minimize the incidence of such faulty behavior in
the future. Rather, liability is imposed for some other reason-per-
haps because it is, in some sense, unfair for an actor to act subop-
timally or inefficiently at the expense of another, or because an in-
nocent victim has a corrective justice right not to suffer harm at the
hands of an actor who "should" (as a matter of his personal utili-
tarian duty) have acted otherwise.33 We might call this the "fault as
inefficiency" approach.
Insofar as courts sometimes employ the Hand test as a utili-
tarian criterion, I believe that they often are employing only a trun-
cated utilitarian approach of the sort I have just described. My rea-
Another way to see this point is to note that for almost any moral theory, some types of pos-
sible consequences of an act matter. On one kind of "objectiver account, whether a particular
consequence actually occurs affects the rightness of the act. On a "subjective" account, whether
the act is right depends on what the actor actually believes, or on what she should believe. Both
consequentialists and deontologists must decide which account to employ; the fundamental ques-
tion is whether morality is concerned with guiding decision-making (the "subjective" account) or
with providing a standard for evaluating the rightness or wrongness of acts. See KAGAN, supra
note 25, at 65-66, 82-84.
Insofar as the fault criterion of negligence is meant to guide decision-making by identifying
when an agent should have taken a precaution against possible future harm, the "subjective"
account is more suitable.
32. Similarly, a fully nonconsequentialist theory provides a nonconsequentialist reason at
both levels.
33. See Simons, supra note 26, at 276, 281-82; Simons, supra note 31, at 84-85.
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son for so believing is simple: quite often, courts that formulate and
apply negligence doctrine are unaware of, do not advert to, or are
uninterested in the deterrent effects of negligence liability.3 4 Thus,
such fault standards as the "Golden Rule," "equal" or "impartial"
consideration of the interests of others, 35 or the "single-owner heu-
ristic"3 6 could express a utilitarian criterion of fault. But if the
standards are deployed in order to express a retrospective judgment
about the actor's fault, not in order to deter actors from engaging in
similar faulty action in the future, then the justification is not fully
consequentialist.
But one might also truncate the utilitarian approach in the
converse way: by imposing liability at level (2) in order to deter and
minimize faulty conduct, while, at level (1), defining personal fault
in noneconomic, nonutilitarian terms.37 This approach is instru-
mentalist in that it seeks to provide actors with financial incentives
to change their behavior, but the ultimate values that it seeks to
promote are not defined in terms of utility. Thus, if fault were de-
fined as any nonconsensual imposition of risk on another, or as any
violation of certain specified rights of a victim, then liability might
be designed primarily to minimize the incidence of such fault.38 As
comment j of the Discussion Draft explains, the goal of providing
appropriate safety incentives includes "broadly humanitarian goals"
as well as overall social welfare. 39 The next Section explores some
34. See Simons, supra note 26, at 277-82. One example is contributory negligence: often
(and especially with respect to personal injury) it is doubtful that the liability rules about
whether a person's own fault will reduce his recovery will affect his primary behavior, yet courts
continue to apply a reasonable person or balancing test in determining contributory negligenco.
The Discussion Draft agrees that the same balancing test should apply both to contributory
negligence and to negligence towards others. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. b.
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. e (1965) (explaining that a negligenco
balancing test requires that the actor "give an impartial consideration to the harm likely to be
done the interests of the other as compared with the advantages likely to accrue to his own in-
terests, free from the natural tendency of the actor ... to prefer his own interests .... ).
36. See Stephen Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1035 (1994) (un-
der the "single-owner heuristic," "the inquiry reduces to whether the average person would take
the precaution if he or she bore both the costs and benefits in fulr').
37. See Gary Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Correc-
tive Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1828-33 (1997); Simons, supra note 31, at 85.
38. To be sure, even on this view, the economic and noneconomic costs of the liability system
itself could be relevant to whether the law should recognize a duty to compensate. (Consider the
fraud and proof problems that would arise if we recognized a cause of action for the negligent
creation of emotional harms.) But viewing such additional costs as relevant does not perforce
transform an instrumentalist approach that is concerned with minimizing injustice or minimiz-
ing rights-violations into a thoroughly utilitarian approach.
39. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. j; see also Schwartz, supra note 37, at 1831 ("Il]f
accident prevention is an economic goal, it is also a generous, warm-hearted, compassionate, and
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plausible interpretations of the Draft's balancing test of negligence
that do not define fault in utilitarian terms.
Finally, although it might seem that the most thoroughly
consequentialist approach to the law of torts must employ both a
utilitarian conception of fault at level (1) and an instrumental con-
ception of the role of liability rules at level (2), this need not be the
case. For it sometimes might be more efficient or utility-maximizing
not to employ a fault criterion at all, i.e. to reject a negligence rule,
in favor of either strict or no liability. Consider the many situations
in which victims have almost no power to minimize the harm; in
these circumstances, a utilitarian analysis would often support
strict liability. And yet, courts impose strict liability much more
rarely than this analysis would endorse. 40 This judicial preference
for fault over strict liability is another indication that a thoroughly
consequentialist approach cannot fully explain the pervasive role of
fault in American tort law.
The upshot of this discussion is that a negligence balancing
test is in principle consistent with a variety of different normative
approaches in tort law, from partial utilitarian views (at level (1)
but not (2), or level (2) but not (1)) to fully nonutilitarian views. A
thoroughly utilitarian view, such as the economic perspective, is
only one such normative approach, and indeed it is sometimes in-
consistent with the fault-based view of negligence reflected in ac-
tual tort doctrine. 41
humane goal As such, it is a goal that can be and is in fact supported by a broad range of schol-
ars.').
Combining a nonutilitarian criterion of fault with an instrumental, consequentialist rationale
for imposing liability for fault is, however, problematic to some nonconsequentialists. This ad-
mixture permits what Nozick called a "utilitarianism of rights." See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARcHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 28 (1974). Just as a nonconsequentialist might object to an agent torturing
one innocent person even if this is necessary in order to prevent ten individuals from being tor-
tured, she might object to a similar consequentialist decision by an agent to minimize the aggre-
gate amount of negligence by committing a negligent act herself. For example, suppose A and B
are intoxicated, and B informs A that he plans to drive them to Bs home. And suppose that A
reasonably believes that he can prevent B's lengthy and dangerous drive home only by immedi-
ately driving them to A's home, which is much closer. Although As driving thereby reduces the
expected risk, someone injured by A's drunken driving might nonetheless have a valid complaint
that A has acted wrongly.
40. See Simons, supra note 26, at 278.
41. Stephen Gilles' contribution to this volume clearly makes the point that the earlier Re-
statements endorsed balancing tests of negligence without committing themselves to a narrow
economic interpretation. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence! Hand Formula
Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L REV. 813 (2001); see also
Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 1431, 1441-43 (2000).
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Moreover, the consistency of different normative approaches
with a balancing test of negligence is evident in the case law. For
example, some tort doctrines can best be explained from a nonin-
strumental perspective. Contributory negligence is one such exam-
ple.42 Another is the emergency doctrine: if we were only concerned
about optimal incentives for future behavior, it might make sense to
impose no liability in cases of genuine emergency, for it is doubtful
that when people are faced with a sudden emergency, they are re-
sponsive to incentives from tort liability rules. Nevertheless, as a
matter of fairness, it is proper to apply a standard of care in an
emergency that is less rigorous than the usual standard, but that is
not completely toothless. 43
Some who reject utilitarian approaches to moral and legal is-
sues would still, however, object to a negligence standard that is
formulated as a Hand balance, even if the standard is only under-
stood as partially utilitarian, at level (1)-i.e., even if a legal rule of
liability for negligence is viewed as expressing only a utilitarian
criterion of fault. It is thus worth considering in more detail
whether the Hand formula must be so viewed.
C. Distinguishing Balancing from Reductionist Cost-Benefit
Calculation
The algebraic formulation of the Hand test can easily be
misunderstood. When we see a formula, a natural inclination is to
fill in the variables with specific quantities and solve the formula.
Moreover, the Hand formula is sometimes described as requiring a
"calculus of risk."44 Such language, if taken literally, implies that
the responsible actor, or the factfinder evaluating his conduct,
should have a calculator at hand, should insert the appropriate
values, and then should wait to see whether the calculation ("Is B <
(P x L)?") shows that the actor was negligent.45
42. See supra note 34.
43. The Discussion Draft appropriately adopts a more forgiving standard for actors in
emergencies. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 7.
44. See, e.g., G. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ad. 1997)
(Section C.3 of Chapter 3, Negligence, is also entitled "Calculus of Risk"); RICHARD EPSTEIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 179 (7th ed. 2000) (Section C of Chapter 3, The Negligence
Issue, is entitled "Calculus of Risk").
45. Cf. Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb.
1981, at 33, 40:
In cost-benefit analysis, equivalencies are established in advance as one of the
raw materials for the calculation. One determines costs and benefits, one de-
termines equivalencies (to be able to put various costs and benefits into a com-
mon measure), and then one sets to toting things up-waiting, as it were, with
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But, of course, Hand himself believed that quantification of
the formula would rarely be possible, 46 and the Discussion Draft
commentary concurs.47 Still, there are aspects of the Discussion
Draft's discussion that are insufficiently reassuring in this respect.
The Discussion Draft suggests that the main problem with applying
a Hand balance in an "operational" and predictable way is eviden-
tiary: as a matter of proof, we often don't have the relevant infor-
mation.48
What this focus on problems of proof ignores, as Gilles points
out in his illuminating paper, is the evaluative dimension in negli-
gence.49 More evidence is useless unless we know what kind of evi-
dence is relevant, and how it is relevant. And value judgments are
necessary in order to determine how the legal decisionmaker should
select among the many possible meanings of the "burdens" of a pre-
caution, or the "benefits" of taking a precaution (including the "rea-
sonably foreseeable" probability of harmful outcomes, and the "se-
verity" of the possible outcomes).
To be sure, by indicating that some of the interests being
balanced are "difficult if not impossible to quantify,"0 and by refer-
ring to the need for "informed judgment" by the jury,5 ' the Draft
bated breath for the results of the calculation to come out. The outcome is de-
termined by the arithmetic; if the outcome is a close call or if one is not good at
long division, one does not know how it will turn out until the calculation is
finished. [By contrast,] [i]n the kind of deliberative judgment that is performed
without a common measure, no establishment of equivalencies occurs in ad-
vance.
See also infra note 110 (noting Gilles' point that cost-benefit analysis is often a matter of re-
flection on the relevant values).
46. Judge Hand himself explained that the value of his approach was "to center attention
upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.m" Moisan v. Loftus,
178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (discussed in the Reporter's Note of Discussion Draft, supra note
2, § 4 cmt. g.)
47. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. g.
48. The Discussion Draft concludes that the balancing approach "is not one that can be ren-
dered operational in a way that generates certain results. Rather, the approach identifies impor-
tant variables for the jury to take into account... ; the jury's responsibility is to render an in-
formed judgment." Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. g.
Similarly, in the judge/jury section, the Discussion Draft suggests that if the facts bearing on
the Hand formula were fully available, "there might frequently be an answer to the negligence
question that all reasonable minds must accept. But because the information presented at trial
is commonly incomplete, reaching a decision on the negligence issue requires an exercise of
judgment by the jury." Id. § 5 cmt. b.
49. Gilles, supra note 41, at notes 117-25.
50. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt g. Examples noted in the Discussion Draft in-
clude the severity of a personal injury, or certain burdens of precaution (such as the failure to
apprehend a suspect if police decline to conduct a high-speed chase, or the invasion of a blood
donor's privacy if a blood bank inquires into the sexual orientation of a potential donor). Id.
51. Id. The Discussion Draft explains that the jury (rather than the judge) plays a large
role in exercising its judgment about negligence "partly because several minds are better than
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does hint at this evaluative dimension.5 2 Yet it fails to explicitly
acknowledge the need for value judgments, addressing such need
only in a statement in the Reporter's Notes 53 and in a passing com-
ment about adolescent risk-taking.5 4 And even those statements
suggest only that certain types of burdens (the lost excitement of a
motorist racing a train, or of adolescents taking risks) should not be
legally recognized. 55 The appropriate question, however, is not
simply whether certain burdens and benefits will be credited at all.
Only rarely will the law give no social recognition to interests that
individuals subjectively view as burdens or benefits. Rather, we
must also consider how much the relevant burdens and benefits
should be valued.56
Thus, although some statements in the Discussion Draft
might imply that conducting a straightforward financial cost-
benefit analysis is the only way, or at least the ideal way, to deter-
mine negligence, in the end this is not a defensible position.
one, and also because of the desirability of taking advantage of the insight of the community, as
embodied in the jury, rather than relying on the professional knowledge of the judge." Id. § 5
cmt. c. Furthermore, "[t]ort law has... accepted an ethics of particularism .... which requires
that actual moral judgments be based on the circumstances of each individual situation." Id. § 5
cmt. d. However, neither statement is clarified, so the nature of the (value) judgment remains
somewhat obscure.
52. The Discussion Draft also suggests that the burdens of taking a precaution "can take a
wide variety of forms," as noted above. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
53. The Reporter's Notes state that in a "limited" number of cases, negligence law declines
to credit burdens, e.g. the lost excitement of a motorist who chooses to race a train towards a
highway crossing. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. c. The Reporter's Notes, unlike the
Restatement black letter provisions and accompanying commentary, are not officially enacted by
the ALI and thus have lesser weight. See About the Restatements, at http://www.ali-
aba.org/alrest.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2001) (indicating that the Reporter's Notes are not
themselves part of the Restatement, because they represent the views of the individual Reporter
rather than those of the American Law Institute).
54. "[It appears that many adolescents display a preference for risk-taking, deriving special
pleasure from behaving in certain risky ways; these are pleasures that negligence law disre-
gards." Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 8 cmt. g.
55. In this respect, the statements are consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, which instructs that the trier of fact should ignore certain costs of improving
a product. "[1It is not a factor under subsection (b) [design defect] that the imposition of liability
would have a negative effect on corporate earnings or would reduce employment in a given in-
dustry." PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. f.
56. Consider the following general characterization in the Reporter's Note:
In general, negligence law takes into account whatever burdens of risk preven.
tion are actually experienced by the actor and others. However, in a limited
number of cases, there are burdens that negligence law declines to credit.
Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. c. This characterization is at least misleading, for it
implies that determining what burdens are "actually experienced" by the actors is a value-free
inquiry.
916
2001] THE HAND FORMULA 917
IV. NEGLIGENCE: THE EVALUATIVE DIMENSION
But what is the most appropriate evaluative approach, and
the most appropriate way to express the need for evaluation, in a
formal negligence standard that requires a balance of the Hand fac-
tors? One option, and the method employed in prior Restatements,
is explicitly to require a balance of "legally recognized" or "social"
interests.57 Standing alone, this doesn't say very much more than
the Hand formula, or the Discussion Draft's version of the Formula.
And the "legally recognized" formulation, without more, is circular:
What interests should the law recognize, and how much should it
value those interests? Still, as I will suggest, the generality of the
term "social" might be a virtue, rather than a vice, in this context.
I will first examine four different evaluative standards, each
of which is more specific and determinate, and has some support in
case law and commentary.58 I will then consider an illustration dis-
cussed in the Discussion Draft and identify the different ways that
it would be analyzed under the four standards. Finally, I will ex-
plain why "social value" is probably the best general language to
use in a Restatement, insofar as it accommodates all four of the dif-
ferent evaluative standards.59
57. See RESTAT_$IEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (in general terms, an "act is negli-
gent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act
or of the particular manner in which it is done"); id. § 292 (referring to "the social value which
the law attaches to the interest" which the actor seeks to promote); id. § 293 (referring to "the
social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled" by the actor). For fur-
ther discussion, see Gilles, supra note 41, at notes 47-58; Green, supra note 23, at 1624. "Social
utility" of the product has also been considered relevant in design defect litigation. Id. at 1634.
When Restatements or judicial opinions refer to "social utility" rather than "social value," one
might assume that the writer is explicitly adopting a utilitarian approach. That is. it might
seem that "social utility" must mean aggregate utility of all persons (rather than just the per-
sonal utility of the defendant and the victim). But I believe that the term is not necessarily
employed in this sense. Rather, it often expresses a social, rather than personal, v, aluation of the
importance of the interests at stake, whether those interests are of the individual defendant and
victim alone or of other persons as well, and whether or not the underlying evaluative approach
is actually utilitarian. For example, Comment d to Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 291
refers to the "social value of the respective interests concerned." Within utilitarian theory, this
reflects the distinction betveen objective and subjective utilitarianism. See Simons, supra note
31, at 73; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text.
58. There are many different ways to carve up the normative world. I choose these four
standards because they are well-represented in both legal doctrine and academic commentary,
and because it is easy to see the relationship between them.
59. For reasons of space, the focus will be on different ways of evaluating the burden of
taking a precaution. Of course, an evaluative judgment is also necessary with respect to the two
other Hand factors-the probability of a harm and the severity of the harm if it occurs.
With respect to probability, the issue is usually framed as whether the risk was "reasonably
foreseeable." This inquiry itself is sometimes usefully recast by balancing the burdens and
benefits of efforts to acquire more information. See supra text accompanying note 10. Moreover,
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The first possible standard is the most closely associated
with economic analysis: the willingness to pay measure. Under one
standard economic interpretation, the Hand formula requires the
actor to take cost-effective precautions, with the relevant costs and
benefits measured by willingness to pay (taking as given the exist-
ing distribution of wealth). Judge Richard Posner has endorsed this
interpretation, 60 in significant part because this measure is much
more tractable than the alternatives. 61 But this is a context in
which it may be better to be vaguely right than precisely wrong.6 2
Even Posner's wealth-maximization interpretation is not easy to
quantify, as he now admits.63 More importantly, that approach is
hardly value-free; it instantiates a controversial normative criterion
about how to value the respective interests. As Posner, to his credit,
concedes, wealth maximization "implies that a person should feel
free to drive faster in a poor than in a wealthy neighborhood be-
cause expected accident costs are on average lower in the former."64
A second possible standard is utilitarian preference-
satisfaction. Under this standard, fault is determined by the actor's
failure to maximize utility, with utility measured by the satisfac-
tion of the preferences of all affected persons. Using this standard,
a negligence standard could also consider more qualitative dimensions of attitudes towards risk,
such as whether the risk is especially dreaded, or whether the victim obtained some benefit from
the risky activity. See Simons, supra note 31, at 82, 86.
With respect to severity, the issue is how property damage, personal injuries of various sorts,
and death are to be evaluated. These are obviously extremely difficult and controversial judg-
ments, involving consideration of physical, emotional, and financial "costs." (For a brief discus-
sion of the problem of valuing human life in the negligence context, see infra text accompanying
notes 84-85.) It is also important to remember that our evaluation of the severity of these harms
is relevant to an ex ante judgment of fault. Whether the same criteria should also be applied in
rendering an ex post judgment of appropriate compensation for negligently-caused harm is an
open question, which I cannot examine here.
60. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philo.
sophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99-111 (David G. Owen ed.
1995) [hereinafter Posner, Wealth Maximization].
61. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 13; Posner, Wealth-Maximization, su.
pra note 60, at 106-08.
62. John Maynard Keynes, "I would rather be vaguely right, than precisely wrong."
63. The Reporter's Note to Discussion Draft Section 4, comment g mentions an opinion
authored by Judge Posner and quotes the following language: "[Flor many years to come juries
may be forced to make rough judgments of reasonableness, intuiting rather than measuring the
factors in the Hand formula." Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 comment g (quoting McCarty v.
Pheasant Run, Inc., 826 F. 2d 1554, 1557 (7th Cir. 1987)).
64. Posner, Wealth Maximization, supra note 60, at 110. As Posner explains, "the magni-
tude of the loss if an accident occurs [is] a function in part of the income of the victim, making
the optimal expenditure of time and other resources on avoiding accidents in the poor neighbor-
hood also lower" (parentheses omitted).
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Posner's example might no longer be troublesome, insofar as the
poor will have just as strong a preference to avoid injury as will the
wealthy; under the first standard, by contrast, the poor lack the
resources to place much "value" on that preference.
A third possible standard, also utilitarian, judges fault ac-
cording to whether an action maximizes social welfare, rather than
maximizing aggregate preference-satisfaction. This standard em-
ploys a much broader criterion of value than does the utilitarian
preference-satisfaction standard. Under the social welfare stan-
dard, all components of social welfare, including such values as
equality and distributive justice, can be included.6 5 This standard
permits a more pluralistic understanding of the values that make
up human welfare, but it might still deserve the name "utilitarian,"
or at least consequentialist, insofar as the ultimate end is to maxi-
mize the aggregate total of human welfare.
A fourth standard (or, more accurately, group of standards)
is not exclusively utilitarian. Under this fourth standard, the indi-
vidual or legal decisionmaker s properly considers morally relevant
features of the situation other than aggregate welfare. Those fea-
tures can include intentions, motives, rights, consent, social role or
responsibility, justifiable expectations or reliance of others, and
reciprocity and distribution of risk.67 But this view also allows for
65. See, e.g., DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALIS.Mi AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 211 (1989)
(defending an "objective utilitarian" approach that views rights, distributive justice, and pursuit
of personal projects, as well as other components of human welfare, as intrinsically good things
to be maximized); KAGAN, supra note 25, §§ 2.4 (equality), 2.6 (consequentialism); Sen, supra
note 7, at 936, 943 (explaining that a broadly consequentialist approach can consider as costs the
violations of rights and limitations on the intrinsic value of fieedom).
The recent book-length article by Kaplow and Shavell seems to straddle the second and third
categories. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 91 (2001). Consistent with the third category, they defend an account of social welfare that
considers not just aggregate welfare but also how welfare is distributed. Id. § H.A.3. However,
they also emphasize the role of individual preference in determining which elements of welfare
should count. Id. §§ II.A.1, VII.B. The latter emphasis is more consistent with the second cate-
gory.
66. Whether the negligence standard is better understood as an ideal decision-maling pro-
cedure for the primary actor, or instead an evaluative standard for the judge or jury, is discussed
infra note 109.
67. For further discussion, see Simons, supra note 26, at 277, 284; Simons, supra note 31, at
82-84.
If the standard is to remain a standard of fault, however, these features must help explain
what was deficient about the actor's conduct. Such features have a very different meaning and
justification if they are used to identify a category of cases appropriate for strict liability Cm
which the actor should pay for resulting harm, even if it cannot be said that he should have acted
otherwise).
Thus, consider two different contexts in which the "expectations" factor has been employed in
tort doctrine. If the reasonable expectations of tenants are relevant to what precautions it is fair
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the possibility that the individual deciding whether to take a pre-
caution should ignore factors that might be relevant in a utilitarian
account, including whether the actor, by omission, failed to benefit
a stranger, and whether the preferences that would be satisfied are
immoral (for example, racist or malicious preferences) or simply
unworthy of social recognition. 68 For example, in some versions of
this fourth criterion, we should be less willing to judge an actor
negligent if his motive in taking a risk was altruistic (e.g., in at-
tempting to save another from danger), if the potential victims fully
consented to the risk,69 or if the actor complied with a custom on
which others justifiably rely. And we might be more willing to judge
an actor negligent, ceteris paribus, if she intends a particular risk of
harm, and does not merely foresee that quantity of risk as a prob-
able side-effect of an activity.70 At the extreme, an actor's inten-
tional creation of risk to others for her own private pleasure might
be considered categorically unreasonable.7 1
to ask a landlord to take against injury, e.g. Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp.,
439 F.2d 477, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1970), then that factor is indeed relevant to fault. But if the ques-
tion is whether a product has a manufacturing flaw that causes the product to malfunction in a
way that disappoints consumer expectations, the factor is relevant to strict liability. See
PRODUCTS LIABILITY supra note 20, § 2, cmt. c. (Similarly, many who advocate a "consumer
expectations" test of product design defect in lieu of the "risk utility" test that the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopted support that alternative test precisely because it
imposes strict liability.)
For a use of the consumer expectations test that appears to equivocate between the two cate-
gories, see id. § 7, providing that a harm-causing ingredient in a food product is properly consid-
ered a manufacturing "defect' (a category normally understood as imposing strict liability) "if a
reasonable consumer would not expect the product to contain that ingredient." At the same
time, however, comment b states: "A consumer expectations test in this context relies upon
culturally defined, widely shared standards that food products ought to meet." (emphasis added).
Such language suggests a fault-based rationale.
68. Consider the benevolent, but paternalistic, desire of a doctor to countermand the pa-
tient's wishes in order to improve the patient's health. The modern American law of informed
consent gives such preferences no weight.
69. For a discussion of the complexity of assumption of risk, see Kenneth W. Simons, As-
sumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L. REV.
213 (1987). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability abolishes assumption
of risk as a distinct doctrine, but does acknowledge that the scope of a duty sometimes depends
on whether the participants in an activity are aware of and agree to accept its inherent risks.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2, cmts. i, j; § 3 cmt. c
(2000) [hereinafter APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY].
70. "Contrast Alice driving near a pedestrian for the thrill of endangering him, with Betty
driving just as close to a pedestrian as an unavoidable incident of bringing her sick child to the
hospital." Simons, supra note 31, at 62; see also id. at 82-83.
71. Often, such an actor would be reckless, and not merely negligent, under the definition in
Section 2, because "the precautions that would eliminate or reduce that risk involves burdens
that are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the actor's failure to adopt the
precaution a demonstration of the actor's indifference to the risk." Discussion Draft, supra note
2, § 2(b). Notably, however, this conclusion depends on a value judgment-that the loss of the
920
2001] THE HAND FORMULA
These four standards will clearly differ in how they resolve
certain issues in tort doctrine.72 Indeed, much of tort doctrine--in-
cluding its very limited duties of affirmative action and its distinct
criteria for different special relationships-reflects an implicit
choice of one of these standards (often, the fourth), or at least a
variant of one of them. What is less clear is whether they will re-
solve differently those issues that are subject simply to a general-
ized "Hand balance."
But even within the more limited context of a generalized
Hand test, the choice of standards can make a difference. Consider
a straightforward example from the Draft, Illustration 1 from Sec-
tion 5:
Susan is the mother of Michael, a 23-month-old child. Susan and Michael are vis-
iting at a vacation home owned by their friend Jon. Susan and Michael are in the
kitchen; the room is lit by a kerosene lamp. If Susan leaves the kitchen for an hour
in order to read a book, and before she returns Michael knocks over the lantern,
starting a fire that damages Jon's cabin, a court should find Susan negligent as a
matter of law. If Michael knocks the lantern over during a 10-second period in
which Susan has turned her back in order to take a boiling pot off the stove, the
court should find as a matter of law that Susan's turning away is not negligent. If
the lantern is knocked over after Susan, wanting to make a quick phone call,
leaves the room for one minute, whether Susan's departure is negligent is a ques-
tion for the jury to decide.7
The example helpfully illustrates a number of points-the
relevance of the Hand factors; the importance of considering the
marginal benefits and burdens of different possible precautions74;
and how the determination of negligence is sometimes a question of
degree. 75
private pleasure one could obtain from intentionally creating a risk is not a legally significant
"burden."
72. For example, the nonutilitarian standard best explains tort law's recognition of only a
limited affirmative duty to act, for most deontological theories accept some version of the
actlomission distinction. See Simons, supra note 26, at 277. That standard might also best jus-
tify the informed consent doctrine, which gives enormous weight to a patient's choice about
medical treatment, even when the medical community would consider that choice unwise. Id. at
284.
73. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 5.
74. These might include:
(1) Not leaving Michael alone more than a certain period of time, for any rea-
son;
(2) Ensuring that Michael is as safe as possible, consistent with his enjoying
some freedom of movement (for example, strapping him into a child seat, if one
is available, or borrowing or renting one, especially if the house is in other re-
spects not safe for children);
(3) Moving the lamp to a safer location.
75. I am not entirely confident, however, that a 10-second period of ignoring a 23-month old
is, as a matter of law, not negligent. Much can happen in 10 seconds, especially if this child is
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Consider some features of how the four different standards
would evaluate this example.76 Under the first two standards,
wealth-maximization and aggregate preference satisfaction, the
"burden" of not making a telephone call depends on Susan's private
valuation of that burden, which can in turn depend on the purpose
of the call. She might be obsessed with her financial future, and
therefore feel a compelling need to telephone her broker to take ad-
vantage of a rising stock market. On the other hand, she might be
calling the doctor to ask about a troubling symptom of Michael. If
she happens to value the first call more highly, then the burden of
not making that call is (ceteris paribus) greater and counts more
strongly against a negligence finding. Needless to say, it is doubtful
that any jury or judge would give weight to that subjective evalua-
tion.
Under the third standard, where "social welfare" is to be
maximized, we might well conclude that immediate health needs
have an urgency and importance in this context that deserve
greater legal recognition than prospective financial profits. This
judgment, however, is one of degree: a phone call to accept a new
job might be more socially important than a call just to confirm that
Michael's strep test is negative. Moreover, the third standard can
accommodate a wider range of values to be maximized, including
equality or distributive justice.77
Now consider the fourth standard. Analysis of Susan's re-
sponsibility to avoid an unreasonable danger of fire damage should
take into account her role as a parent. She has a duty to look out for
the welfare of her child, encompassing both a concern for her child's
physical safety and a concern to permit the child a certain amount
of freedom and independence. To be sure, the third standard might
conceptualize these concerns as competing welfare interests and
known to be rambunctious. The illustration would be more convincing if the time period it iden.
tified as conclusively non-negligent were five seconds.
76. For reasons of space, I emphasize only certain important features. One could certainly
develop more complex accounts that attempt to reconcile each standard with common sense
intuitions about fault. For example, a wealth-maximization approach might well emphasize tho
institutional costs of resting negligence judgments on unreliable evidence about the actor's pri-
vate preferences. But it is still worth noting how significantly the standards can differ when wo
put those costs to one side.
Moreover, the ability of a standard to give a more straightforward explanation that accords
with common sense judgments does, in my view, count in favor of that standard. And I believe
that common sense judgments often support the more pluralistic fourth standard.
77. Here is a very small-scale example of "distributive justice": it might be reasonable for
Susan to leave Michael alone for a while so that she can spend some time alone with her other,
older child.
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might thus require Susan to maximize their aggregate value (as
well as the value of her own welfare and the welfare of her friend
Jon). But this is only one possible perspective. We might instead
view a parent's moral position as departing from a maximizing
model in at least two ways: (1) as requiring the parent to sacrifice
his or her own interests, to a considerable extent, to promote the
interests of a child, even if the former "cost" might be viewed as
greater than the latter "benefit!'; and (2) as entailing a permission
or prerogative, within a significant range, to act in what she be-
lieves to be her child's best interest, even if some acts within that
range are significantly more dangerous to the child or to third par-
ties than are others.78 In light of (1), the fact that Susan is tired of
caring for Michael might be entitled to little weight, for she has in-
deed assumed a parental responsibility that ordinarily precludes
that type of tradeoff of welfare. In light of (2), Susan might decide
to warn Michael to behave but then trust him to be alone, in order
to develop his independence. Such a choice might be reasonable,
especially if he has acted reliably in the past, even though the
choice does increase the risks that Michael will pose to himself and
to others.
Other examples in the Discussion Draft would also be ana-
lyzed differently, depending on the evaluative standard. For exam-
ple, "in a case in which a blood bank is allegedly negligent for fail-
ing to inquire into the sexual orientation of potential donors, the
burden involves the interference with those donors' privacy." 9 The
Discussion Draft says that this is a situation in which "the burden
of precaution . . . is a value that resists quantification."80 True
enough, but one could say more: privacy is an interest that will be
78. For example, within a significant range, a parent might properly choose to emphasize
the child's independence and self.knowledge, or instead to be highly protective of the child's
physical safety. Some parents would not leave Michael alone in a room for more than a couple of
seconds; others would encourage his independent explorations even at some risk to his or others'
physical safety.
One reason for recognizing an age-sensitive standard of care in negligence law is the social
value of encouraging learning and experimentation by the young. Interestingly, that value is not
mentioned in the Discussion Draft's account of this issue. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 8
and accompanying comments. Notice that this is an instance in which social value can differ
from subjective value, insofar as some children do not subjectively appreciate the value of taking
risks that provide long-term benefits. (I count as evidence my own reluctance as a child to learn
to ride a bike, an attitude that my children inherited.)
On the role of permissions or prerogatives in deontological morality, see SAMUEL SCHEAFLR,
THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (1982); Kamm, supra note 25, at 207-03.
79. Discussion Draft § 4 cmt. g. The Reporter's Notes identify Doe v. American National
Red Cross, 866 F. Supp. 242 (D. Md. 1994), as such a case.
80. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. g.
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understood very differently, depending on the evaluative standard.
Under the first standard, a relevant question is how much the do-
nor would pay to be free of such an inquiry. Depending on the do-
nor's resources and need for money, the amount might be negligi-
ble. Under the third standard, privacy might be viewed as an objec-
tive value, even if some donors would readily waive it. Finally, un-
der the fourth standard, rather than developing a policy that at-
tempts to maximize the differential between the health benefits of
invasive questioning and the privacy costs of such questioning, per-
haps the hospital should simply forbid any questioning about sex-
ual orientation or sexual practices, regardless of the health benefits
of such questioning, based on the qualitative nature of the privacy
interest.8 l
This brief analysis is only suggestive. 82 Proponents of any of
the standards might well attempt to reduce or translate prescrip-
tions suggested by the other standards into the terms employed in
the standard that they prefer. In this short space, I cannot prove,
though I do believe, that something is often lost in such a transla-
tion. I tried to demonstrate only that each of the four standards of-
fers a plausible and distinct evaluative account of the interests that
a negligence test balances.83
One final problem should be noted. The evaluative dimension
of negligence extends to the valuation of personal injury and death.
If too low a value is placed upon human life, the negligence stan-
81. This approach still requires evaluative distinctions among interests that people wish to
keep private. In order to determine the degree of precaution that hospital employees should
employ in treating patients, a hospital might be permitted to question an emergency room pa.
tient about drug use but not about sexual orientation, if privacy with respect to sexual orienta-
tion is properly valued much more highly.
82. Other ways in which the fourth standard might have unique application to the illustra-
tion can quickly be noted. First, the duties of a parent toward Michael might be viewed differ-
ently than the duties of a babysitter hired to care for him. For example, the parent should have
greater discretion to leave him alone in order to encourage his long-term self-sufficiency. Second,
if the owner of the house has children, and otherwise appears to be careful of their safety, per-
haps Susan can justifiably assume that the kerosene lamp is in a reasonably safe location.
Moreover, in an otherwise close case, we might credit Susan's concern that quizzing her friend
about safety precautions would demonstrate a lack of trust. For a comparable example, see
Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. d (if an actor takes the precaution of not lending a car to
a friend known to have a deficient driving record, the "burden" of this precaution is the inability
to satisfy a friend's need).
83. This example involves the special role of a parent. Arguably, there might be less differ-
ence between the four evaluative standards when the injurer and victim are strangers without
such a special relationship. Still, even within the category of "stranger," there are important
distinctions. The relationship of a driver to a pedestrian might differ from the relationship of a
bicyclist to a pedestrian, in terms of social expectations, reliance, and other factors relevant to
the evaluative inquiry.
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dard will be too forgiving.8 4 If too high a value is placed upon hu-
man life, the negligence standard will be too stringent. Juries and
judges, however, are ill-equipped to make these controversial
evaluations, and the process of making these judgments on a case-
by-case basis threatens to cause similar fact patterns to be treated
quite inconsistently.
In the long run, it might be preferable if legislatures were to
specify a presumptive value of human life for purposes of the negli-
gence balance, allowing or encouraging variations in this valuation
in particular contexts.85 It is doubtful, however, that a court would
feel competent to adopt such a presumptive figure. For now, it
seems, courts will need to muddle through this issue as best they
can.
V. AN INCLUSIVE STATEMENT OF THE HAND STANDARD
The upshot? Because a diversity of evaluative stances are de-
fensible, the language of a Restatement balancing test should be
both accommodating and general. At the same time, it is important
that the Restatement both recognize and approve the significance of
the evaluative function itself.
Accordingly, the Hand formula should employ the language
of "socially recognized advantages and disadvantages" as a signal
that social judgments about policy and principle are critical. Fur-
thermore, the commentary should articulate the need for the deci-
sionmaker to make value judgments in appropriate cases. At the
same time, it is impossible for one simple formula to express the
84. The popular outrage at the cost-benefit balance in the infamous Ford Pinto case can be
partly explained on this basis. In the cost-benefit study that was widely reported in connection
with the Ford Pinto litigation, the value assigned to a human life was only $200,000. Still, there
are reasons for caution before assuming that Ford deserves blame for its design decision or for its
decision not to recall Ford Pintos for a retrofit. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the
Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013 (1991).
85. For discussion of varying assessments of the value of human life in different regulatory
contexts, see Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1995); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1037, 1044-45 (2000) (discussing the broader category of irreplaceable commodities).
Kornhauser also points out that even on a subjective preference approach, the value of life can
vary depending on the context. Thus, a smoker might pay more for a social policy that reduces,
by halft the risk that a smoker will contract lung cancer than for a policy that reduces, by half,
the death rate from lung cancer. Although each policy has the same effect on the expected num-
ber of deaths from smoking, "a smoker may find it particularly troubling that her disease is
attributable to her smoking," and thus might be willing to pay more for the first policy. Id. at
1051. For a different explanation of this example, see Richard A. Posner, Cost.Benefit Analysis
Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1160
(2000).
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variety of justifications and values that courts do, and should, en-
dorse. The Discussion Draft should recognize this point, and should
also encourage the decisionmaker to articulate more specific values
in particular cases, keeping in mind the fundamental features of a
negligence test-an ex ante judgment of fault, in light of the fore-
seeable, marginal advantages and disadvantages of a precaution.
A. Pluralism
Under any of the four approaches, it is important to recall
the generality of the negligence formula: it addresses any conduct
risking physical harm to others.8 6 Accordingly, the formula must be
articulated in such a way as to include the wide diversity of rele-
vant interests.
There is some danger that because the Hand formula identi-
fies only the three factors of B, P, and L as relevant to the negli-
gence judgment, the Discussion Draft's version of the formula will
be interpreted as narrowing the range of relevant interests. But the
Discussion Draft helpfully addresses this problem, both by identi-
fying B, P, and L as only "primary factors," and by acknowledging
in the comments that the burden of precautions "can take a very
wide variety of forms."87
Of course, each of the four approaches adumbrated above
will understand the Hand factors differently. In a sense, the first
two approaches are the broadest, for the factors that they consider
potentially relevant to the negligence decision include any interests
that precautions could affect and that have any subjective value (as
measured by willingness to pay, or simply by preference). On the
other hand, insofar as only actual aggregate preferences are rele-
vant, these approaches will sometimes give less weight to values
than will the third or four approaches. (These subjective value ap-
proaches, if most people in a community only minimally value, or
even disvalue, the welfare of certain minority citizens, an act that
risks harm only to such citizens is less likely to be judged
negligent.88) Also, the third and fourth approaches draw qualitative
86. Actually, legal negligence doctrines extend even more broadly, encompassing some cases
in which the actor causes economic and emotional harms. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS
ch. 20 & Part IV (2000). The current Draft, however, addresses only negligent creation of physi-
cal harm. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 2 cmt. a.
87. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4 cmt. d.. Moreover, the Discussion Draft gives exam-
ples that demonstrate this range. See supra text accompanying note 8.
88. For example, under these approaches, if most citizens have "negative attitudes" towards
the mentally retarded because of their unusual appearance or mannerisms, such subjective prof-
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distinctions, recognizing some components of human welfare as
relevant, but (especially under the fourth approach) not others.
Thus, the first approach might result in a relatively homoge-
nized cost-benefit analysis, in which the values are reduced to fi-
nancial costs whenever feasible. But under at least the third and
fourth approaches, the interests to be balanced could well be irre-
ducibly pluralistic, lacking any common coin or metric. (Recall that
the relevant factors under the third standard can include distribu-
tion as well as aggregate welfare, and under the fourth can encom-
pass such features as social role, reliance, expectations, motives,
and rights.) This is not to say, however, that the balancing is irra-
tional or indeterminate. Incommensurability in the strong sense is
rare.89 Rather, the judgment of how to balance parental responsi-
bility for a child's long-term development against safety risks, or
privacy against health, will require a sensitive understanding of
social responsibilities as well as knowledge of the facts.
To some extent, such negligence judgments can be crystal-
lized in the form of rules. Without fully entering the debate about
whether the legal element of "duty" should play a larger role in the
Discussion Draft than the current draft assigns to it,90 I suggest
that many, and perhaps even all, of the issues conventionally ana-
lyzed under the rubric of "no duty" and "limited duty" rules can be
fruitfully analyzed under a more subtle, complex, pluralistic under-
standing of the factors and valuations relevant to a determination
of negligence. Accordingly, while there is much to be said for the
Discussion Draft's rhetoric viewing "duty" as largely a non-issue,91
the rhetoric would be more convincing if the Discussion Draft's
analysis of negligence more explicitly addressed the variety of fac-
tors that are often viewed as relevant or decisive on the duty
issue.9 2
erences should count in favor of finding a retarded person contributorily negligent simply for
venturing into a public place (where, let us assume, teenagers endanger her for fun). Cf. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (forbidding a city from relying on
such prejudice and holding that municipal zoning ordinance violated equal protection).
89. See Simons, supra note 31, at 80.
90. See John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Third Restatement and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657 (2001), for a critique of the Draft's position on
this issue; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146
U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998).
91. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 6 & cmt a.
92. What should be the respective roles of judge and jury in determining negligence? This
is obviously one of the key issues in deciding whether "duty" should remain a distinct element of
the negligence cause of action, and if so, its proper scope. A viable alternative, however, is to
eliminate duty as a distinct element and, at the same time, to develop a clear set of standards for
the allocation of judicial and jury responsibility in defining negligence.
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For example, when the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prod-
ucts Liability articulates the risk/utility test for design and warning
defects, it essentially adopts a negligence analysis, but it crystal-
lizes what negligence means in this particular context by carefully
articulating a set of rules, relevant factors, and accompanying poli-
cies. 93 These specific rules-such as rules about whether a product
manufacturer, a seller of used products, or a private seller has a
duty to warn users, and rules about the scope of any such duty-are
justified by considering and balancing a range of factors. The speci-
fication of these duties can be understood as simply a sensitive,
contextual application of the Hand test to a recurrent set of prob-
lems.
B. Complexity and the Generality of the Negligence Inquiry
At this point, it is natural to wonder: why must the analysis
of negligence be so complex? That complexity is striking in compari-
son to the simpler and more determinate rules of contract or prop-
erty law, and even intentional tort standards.
The basic reason, I think, is the extraordinary generality of
negligence law. Negligence law (even if limited to risks of physical
harm to others) covers the waterfront of legal and moral concern.
Legally, it comprises an enormous residual category of private
rights-essentially, those not recognized in contract or property.
Morally, it comprises an enormous residual category of unjustified
acts-namely, acts other than (a) those which the agent believes are
likely to cause harm, or (b) those by which she intends to do harm
or to invade another's legally protected interests.
To put the point differently, negligence is not really a dis-
tinct moral domain. It is just one part of action-guiding morality,
the part in which the risk of future harm is not great.94 But in ac-
93. See, e.g., PRODUC'rS LIABILITY, supra note 20, § 2 cmt. f (listing as factors relevant to do-
sign defect "the magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and
warnings accompanying the product, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations
regarding the product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and marketing," as
well as "the likely effects of the alternative design on production costs; the effects of the alterna.
tive design on product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and the range of consumer
choice among products....1").
94. Simons, supra note 31, at 61-66. To be sure, there are institutional features of a tort
negligence judgment that support a different understanding of a legal "negligence" judgment
than of a moral judgment that an actor has been negligent or faulty in creating a risk of harm.
Creating trivial risks of harm, or risks of purely emotional or economic harm, might deserve
moral blame but not legal sanction. See id. at 89. And, partly for pragmatic reasons, the legal
standard sometimes departs from a standard of moral fault-for example, ignoring mental inca-
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tion-guiding morality itself-that is, the set of principles that tell
us what we should do-a wide range of values are relevant. That is,
even if we knew to a certainty the advantages and disadvantages of
a particular action, we would need to make complex judgments
about diverse values in order to decide what a person should do. So
it should not be surprising that, in making negligence judgments,
we must consider a wide range of values, and we might not even be
sure about the best way to structure the analysis. For negligence
analysis is continuous with normative analysis more generally.95
And no simple deductive procedure exists for resolving normative
issues.96
In short, because negligence is the minimal degree of moral
"fault" necessary to support tort liability, a legal negligence stan-
dard must ask this question: when can we conclude that the actor
"should have acted otherwise" with respect to creating a risk of
physical harm? If that remarkably broad inquiry is the question,
then we cannot really expect any simple, mechanical formula to
provide the answer.
C. Flexibility and Legal Change
By giving more emphasis to the need for the legal decision-
maker to make a value judgment in applying the Hand formula, the
Discussion Draft would helpfully underscore an important feature
of a generalized balancing formula: its flexibility. And one espe-
cially valuable type of flexibility here is the formula's capacity to
adapt to changes, in both fact and value, over time.
Consider an example. Courts are increasingly willing to im-
pose liability on commercial servers of alcohol, and occasionally
even on social hosts, who provide alcohol to intoxicated individuals
when the server knows or should know that the individual is intoxi-
pacity or conclusively presuming that certain types of conduct (such as not paying full attention
at all times while driving) are negligent. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, §§ 9 cmt. e, 4 cmt.
k.
However, the balancing judgment implicit in a legal judgment of negligence still remains ex-
tremely broad. In terms of Lewis Kornhauser's helpful distinction between 'localr and "global"
cost-benefit judgments, it clearly falls on the "global" end of the continuum. See Kornhauser,
supra note 86, at 1051-56.
95. Although the analysis of intentional invasions and knowing harm-creation is less com-
plex, this is so because such acts are prima facie unjustified; accordingly, the structure of analy-
sis is simpler. We first recognize prima facie intentional torts, which are relatively well-defined,
and then allow only limited defenses. See Simons, supra note 31, at 56-57.
96. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Resolution of Vblue Conflics-
What We Can Realistically Expect, in Practice, from Theory, 17 BEHAV. SCI. LxW 555 (1999).
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cated.97 In part, this change reflects increased knowledge of the
facts-namely, the degree of danger posed by intoxicated drivers. In
significant part, however, the change reflects a change in values.98
Requiring those who serve alcohol to protect against the dangers
posed by the intoxicated is now viewed as not unduly onerous.
Moreover, the personal pleasure deriving from intoxication might
now be viewed as having less social value than it formerly did.99
VI. THE LIMITED ROLE OF THE "REASONABLE PERSON"
Might we avoid the difficulties of definition and analysis ex-
amined above by employing a "reasonable person" or "reasonably
prudent person" test? After all, this is the negligence standard that
continues to be widely employed in jury instructions. Despite this
fact, the Discussion Draft chooses to employ the reasonable person
test in only a limited way. 00 I think this choice is sensible, for sev-
eral reasons.
First, the "reasonable person" test is obscure. Although it
does tell us that the subjective views of the actor are not decisive of
fault, it does not explain which factors are relevant to fault.101
97. See DOBBS, supra note 86, at 899-903.
98. For an explicit statement to this effect, see Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1229 (N.J.
1984).
99. Another example is Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal,
1976). It is doubtful that the ability of therapists to predict violence or to notify others effectivoly
about the risks that their patients pose has changed much over time. The judicial recognition of
some minimal duty of care seems to reflect instead a changing conception of the appropriate
social role of a therapist.
The same is true of (1) the duties of landowners under the approach of Rowland v. Christian,
443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968), which expands duties to licensees and even to trespassers, see DOBBS,
supra note 86, at § 237; and of (2) the duties of landlords, who have an increasing responsibility
to protect against third party criminal attacks. Id. § 325.
100. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
101. Sometimes it is suggested that the inquiry should be sharpened to "the reasonable per-
son in the community." See generally Gilles, supra note 41; Patrick J. Kelley, Who Decides?
Community Safety Conventions at the Heart of Tort Liability, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 315 (1990).
But the meaning and relevance of "community values" remain obscure. See Kenneth Abraham,
The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1187 (2001) ("[A]t the level of fine detail that is at
stake in ordinary unbounded negligence cases, there is usually no single conscience of the com-
munity. The values of contemporary society are too diverse for that.").
Thus, the "community" standard cannot refer to actual customary behavior, for custom is not
ordinarily the dispositive standard of care in a negligence case, except in limited contexts such as
professional malpractice. If "community" refers not to actual practice, but instead to idealized
moral beliefs and practices, then why not directly examine those ideals?
Moreover, "community" might suggest a geographical criterion, but what is the appropriate
locus? One answer is that "community" coincides with the jurisdiction of the legal decision-
maker; so if the lawsuit is in Tennessee, the "community" is that state. But upon reflection, it is
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Second, I do not believe that a "reasonable person" criterion
is morally fundamental.10 2 In an extralegal context, it would be odd,
if not incomprehensible, to analyze the morality of a decision by
considering what a "reasonable person" would do. Rather, we di-
rectly advert to the features of the situation (actions, reasons, be-
liefs, consequences, and the like) that seem morally relevant.
Why, then, do legal standards employ "reasonableness" or
"reasonable person" criteria? Such criteria can serve a number of
distinctive institutional functions. Specifically, in a negligence in-
struction, the "reasonable person" language might be helpful rhet-
orically (though not substantively). For it does humanize and make
concrete a test that might otherwise be forbiddingly abstract, espe-
cially to a lay juror 10 3 and especially in the assessment of the con-
duct of an individual.10 4 Furthermore, the test does emphasize fault,
by underscoring that the actor must have failed to act as would a
reasonable person. Thus, it might be appropriate to include such
language in a jury instruction, either alone or together with the
Hand factors. Still, the Hand test gives much more guidance, and
accordingly should be employed by trial and appellate judges in
rulings on the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence.105
Third, the Discussion Draft's approval of the reasonable per-
son test in limited contexts is itself revealing about the nature of a
negligence standard. Most significant is the Discussion Draft's en-
dorsement of the reasonable person test for cases of inadvertent
not obvious that"community values" should be relevant in this way. Rather, which 'community"
is relevant depends on the underlying normative approach (preference-maximization, utilitarian,
or fairness). See Kenneth NV. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts
Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, and Dentocracy, 28 HOFSTRA L REV. 636 (2000) (ana-
lyzing this issue in the criminal law context).
102. See Simons, supra note 31, at 87-88.
103. Also, as noted above, it might be helpful in expressing the idea that the interests to be
balanced are (only) those that are socially reasonable, not those that the individual plaintiff or
defendant happens to value.
104. In the context of a business or corporate entity, even this rhetorical value is dubious.
What would a "reasonable corporation" do?
105. More generally, "reasonableness" standards are often used in legal standards (especially
tort and criminal law) to emphasize (a) that proving the actor's subjective, inculpatory beliefs is
not necessary to establish a prima facie case against him, or (b) that proving the actor's subjec-
tive, exculpatory beliefs is not sufficient to support a defense. Sometimes (as in defining what
types of threats are necessary to justify serious or deadly defensive force) the law explicitly de-
fines what "reasonable" means (e.g., a threat of deadly force or kidnapping), instead of simply
leaving the judgment to the jury or individual judge. On other occasions, a more vague "reason-
ableness" standard is employed, but normally this judgment is quite circumscribed. In self-
defense, it usually governs whether the actor reasonably believed that he was facing a defined
type of threat, and, more broadly, whether he had a "reasonable alternative7 way to avoid caus-
ing injury. See generally Simons, supra note 32, at 87-88.
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negligence. 10 6 In some cases, the Discussion Draft suggests, there
may be evidence bearing on the burden of paying more attention.
"In many cases, however, the level of the burden, and hence the
reasonableness of the person's inattentiveness, are largely matters
of common sense."10 7 In such cases, "the decisionmaker can simply
consider whether the reasonably careful person would have been
aware of the risk."'10 8
This approach is both plausible and illuminating. The prob-
lem of applying a Hand balancing test to inadvertence underscores
that we need a negligence test sufficiently general to encompass all
cases of unjustifiable, risky action, not just cases in which the actor
has consciously weighed the relevant interests. It also underscores
a more fundamental point: to judge conduct as faulty is not neces-
sarily to judge the actor's reasoning or decision-process as faulty.10 9
The "reasonable person" language could then be useful in clarifying
that conduct can be unreasonable even in instances where the ac-
tor's fault does not consist in consciously balancing interests in an
unreasonable way.110
106. Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 4, cmt. k.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The distinction between an actual decision-procedure and a standard for evaluating the
rightness of an action is a fundamental one in moral theory, and is especially important in utili-
tarian and cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., DAVID BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF ETHICS 216-217, 265-67 (1989) (utilitarian analysis); Posner, supra note 85, at 1154
(cost/benefit analysis). For example, on a utilitarian theory that seeks to impartially maximize
the aggregate welfare of all, aggregate utility might well be maximized if parents (as a matter of
personal decision-procedure) give enormous weight to the interests of their own family, relative
to the interests of others, rather than always impartially weighing the interests of all persons
equally.
Thus, utilitarians should not too quickly assume that a utilitarian criterion of personal fault
will require the actor to adopt a uniform decision procedure of impartially weighing all interests.
Legal doctrines imposing distinctive (and sometimes limited) duties of care based on role respon-
sibility or based on failure to rescue clearly do not require such impartiality, yet utilitarians and
economists have offered plausible arguments that such doctrines can serve utilitarian ends. Less
obviously, an interpretation of the negligence standard that requires an actor to employ a con-
scious decision procedure of "benevolent impartiality" might actually result in suboptimal ac.
tions, relative to a different interpretation of the negligence standard. (This is one reason why
the "single-owner heuristic" will not always be the best interpretation of negligence from a utili.
tarian standard. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.) As a simple example, it is undoubt-
edly best if automobile drivers focus their attention mainly on the immediate risks around them,
rather than constantly surveying their entire field of vision (and even turning their head) to look
out for more remote risks.
110. Consider another illustration of this point besides inadvertence. An actor can be negli-
gent due to lack of reasonable skill in conducting an activity, even if the actor is doing his best
and is aware of the risks he is running. The fault lies not in making an unjustifiable tradeoff
between the burdens and benefits of a specific precaution, but in failing to conduct the activity
with sufficient skill. (If your skill at riding a bike is sufficient that it is not unreasonable for you
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But how can the Discussion Draft be confident that "common
sense" is an apt guide to the amount of attention that an actor
should pay to his surroundings? After all, this is clearly not an ade-
quate standard in most cases of advertent negligence. The answer, I
believe, is the very limited scope of the first inquiry. It is doubtful
that different normative standards (such as standards one through
four above) will differ on whether a pedestrian should check care-
fully for traffic before crossing a street. For similar reasons, it is not
surprising that self-defense standards, in both tort and criminal
law, contain only undefined "reasonable belief' standards for judg-
ing the severity of an attack or the necessity of a defensive re-
sponse; what a person should believe and should infer about these
factual matters ordinarily invites a fairly limited inquiry."'
Finally, it is worth considering one important attempt to
take the "reasonable person" standard seriously as a substantive
and freestanding criterion of negligence. This is the virtue ethics
approach. On this view, "right action" is the action that a "virtuous"
agent would characteristically perform.112 Moreover, some support
for this interpretation can be found in the fact that jury instruc-
to ride on a busy street, you still might be negligent if you carelessly lose control of the bike on a
particular occasion.)
That negligence encompasses lack of reasonable skill also helps explain why the anthropo-
morphic "reasonable person" approach is employed to vary the standard of care for children and
for those with disabilities. A "reasonable blind person" test connotes not only that a conscien-
tious blind person would consciously balance the Hand factors differently than a sighted person,
but also that his ability to safely and skillfully perform certain tasks (such as crossing a street) is
different.
Finally, even when individuals consciously choose between options, they often make implicit
rather than explicit judgments about the relative values at stake. As Gilles points out:
[M]ost people, even those who consider themselves utilitarians, make only a
fraction of their choices by attempting to compare choice A to choice B in terms
of an external metric such as utility or money. That is how one chooses at a
supermarket, not how one chooses, for example, whether to drive a bit faster so
as to have more time with one's family. In many contexts, including matters of
safety, individuals consider what they know about choices A and B, reflect on
the values they associate with those choices, and decide which they prefer.
Gilles, supra note 36, at 1032-33. Once again, this reveals that the Hand formula is often not
employed as an explicit decision-making procedure.
111. See supra note 105.
112. According to one recent formulation: "An action is right [if and only if] it is what a virtu-
ous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) do in the circumstances." ROSALIND
HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHIcs 28 (1999); see also Feldman, supra note 41, at 1450 (arguing
that when the jury engages in the thought experiment of imagining what a reasonable (virtuous)
person would do, it operationalizes virtue ethics and gives it prescriptivity). For a sustained
argument that virtue ethics can be action-guiding, notwithstanding critics' doubts on this score,
see HURSTHOUSE, supra, at Ch. 1-3.
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tions in negligence cases sometimes mention such virtues as pru-
dence and benevolence. 113
It is not yet clear whether this approach can offer a genuine
and realistic alternative to the utilitarian and fairness approaches
mentioned above. To date, defenders of this approach have not per-
suasively explained how a negligence analysis can abjure considera-
tion of the Hand factors-at least if they wish to provide primary
actors, juries, and judges with a modicum of guidance about the
content of the negligence norm." 4 Perhaps the point of some virtue
theorists is that the evaluation of those factors should take into ac-
count the virtuous or vicious motives of the actor, or should spell
out what such virtues as prudence and benevolence mean in the
context of balancing disadvantages of taking a precaution against
the risk of future loss that the precaution would avoid."5 If so, then
I have less of a quarrel, since that point is consistent with my ar-
gument for an inclusive understanding of the Hand test.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Discussion Draft should not take sides on the highly
disputed question whether negligence is better understood as ex-
pressing efficiency or fairness. It should, however, reflect the diver-
sity of approaches that courts do pursue, so long as each of the ap-
proaches expresses a justifiable understanding of negligence. I have
tried to show that a range of approaches is consistent with the same
fundamental understanding of negligence as a species of fault, as
failure to take a reasonable precaution in light of the foreseeable
advantages and disadvantages of taking such a precaution.
Negligence doctrine will and should continue to develop more
specific standards in particular fields. The conventional wisdom
that negligence rules normally cannot be articulated beyond the
facts of a given case is wrong; negligence doctrine is full of special
rules and standards. Although rigid, bright-line rules are often in-
113. See Feldman, supra note 41, at 1447 (quoting jury instructions from several jurisdic-
tions).
114. Feldman argues for a greater emphasis on the virtues of prudence and benevolence, but
she has not yet clarified the meaning of the virtue of "reasonableness." Feldman, supra note 41,
at 1431. She does, however, suggest that virtue ethics properly abjures reductionist formulas
and that juries should have broad discretion to decide what is "the proper balance between safety
and freedom." Id. at 1433.
115. For an analysis suggesting that the virtue of prudence can indeed include weighing of
factors such as those of the Hand formula, see James Gordley, Tort Law in the Aristotelian Tra.
dition, in PHILOSOPHIcAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAV 131, 147 (David G. Owen, ed., 1995).
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advisable,1 6 more flexible rules and standards are often both feasi-
ble and desirable. Precedent, related statutory rules, and customary
norms should also play a role in limiting the open-ended quality of
negligence judgments.
Moreover, it would be especially helpful if courts were to give
more attention to how negligence standards apply to business and
corporate entities. Such actors are more likely than individuals to
consciously weigh the advantages of precautions against the disad-
vantages. In popular culture, however, there is a distressing ten-
dency to assume that such deliberate tradeoffs inevitably reflect a
callousness to human suffering."7 If an actor, whether individual or
corporate, makes a reasonable tradeoff, that should certainly sat-
isfy negligence standards. 118
In the end, a determination that an actor is negligent re-
flects a value judgment at two levels. It expresses the judgment
that the actor should have done something different in light of the
foreseeable risks of his conduct. It also presupposes value judg-
ments about the relevant advantages and disadvantages of taking
such a precaution. The task of conscientiously identifying and clari-
fying the appropriate value judgments is not easy, but it is un-
avoidable if negligence is to remain a justifiable ground of tort li-
ability.
116. The famous cases of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927), and
Pokora v. Wabash Railway, 292 U.S. 98 (1934), should be viewed as establishing only this nar-
row point. Unfortunately, the cases are often taken to establish the much broader point that a
Hand balancing test (or even a vaguer "reasonable person under the circumstances test) is as
precise as we can get in articulating the meaning of negligence.
117. See NV. ip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547
(2000). This assumption is aggravated by (or perhaps a manifestation of) the difficulty of as-
signing a value to personal injury and death. See supra note 59.
118. The Discussion Draft helpfully underscores this point. Comment d to Section 2 (defin-
ing "reckless") explains:
[T]he fact that the actor, because of the burden entailed by a particular provi-
sion, has made a deliberate choice to omit a precaution and hence to tolerate a
risk by no means signifies that the person has behaved recklessly. Indeed, the
fact that such a choice has been made does not even show that the actor has be-
haved negligently. Rather, the actor is negligent only for making an unwise
choice. In a sense, the very objective of negligence law is to encourage actors to
acknowledge and confront such choices, and to render these choices wisely
rather than unwisely.
Discussion Draft, supra note 2, §2 cmt.d.
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VIII. APPENDIX: PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR THE DRAFT
RESTATEMENT
The following language, modifying the Discussion Draft, is
suggested in order to implement the analysis in this article.
1. The definition of "Negligent" in §4: Two alternatives
(a) Modification of the Discussion Draft's black letter language
(new language is underlined):
An actor is negligent in engaging in conduct if the actor
does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances.
Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether conduct lacks
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in
harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and
the burden that would be borne by the actor and others if the ac-
tor takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of
harm. The social value of the interests imperiled is the standard
for evaluating the severity of the harm. The social value of the
benefits foregone or the burdens incurred is the standard for
evaluating the burden of taking precautions.
Note: the language of "social value" is drawn from Restatement
(Second) of Torts, §§292, 293.
(b) Alternative formulation to replace Discussion Draft's black
letter language:
An actor is negligent when the actor should have taken a rea-
sonable precaution against the foreseeable risks of harm posed by
his or her conduct. In determining whether an actor should have
take a precaution, the burden of taking that precaution should
ordinarily be balanced against the risks that the precaution
would avoid. The magnitude of those risks depends on both the
foreseeable likelihood of harm and the severity of that harm if it
occurs.
The social value of the interests imperiled is the standard for
evaluating the severity of the harm. The social value of the bene-
fits foregone or the burdens incurred is the standard for evaluat-
ing the burden of taking precautions.
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Note: the first sentence of this alternative partly draws on the de-
sign and warning language of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability, §2.
2. Additional language emphasizing the need for evaluative
judgment
In comment d to §4:
(a) Add the underlined language to the last paragraph on p.
44:
The balancing approach rests on and expresses a simple idea.
Conduct is negligent if its socially recognized disadvantages ex-
ceed its socially recognized advantages, while conduct is not neg-
ligent if its social advantages exceed its social disadvantages.
(b) Add the following paragraphs at the end of comment d, p.
45:
In balancing the primary factors, the decisionmaker appro-
priately considers their social value. Accordingly, in some cases,
private burdens exist that negligence law declines to credit at all.
For example, some motorists might derive excitement from racing
a railroad train towards a highway crossing. In deciding what is a
reasonable speed for the motorist to drive, the decisionmaker
should ignore the burden on a motorist of forgoing that excite-
ment. It is not reasonable to permit a motorist to impose greater
risks upon others in order to preserve that kind of antisocial pri-
vate benefit.
In all cases, the social value of the burden of taking a precau-
tion is a question for the decisionmaker, not for the individual ac-
tor. Often the decisionmaker's value judgment will be implicit,
but an explicit articulation of the relevant values can be appro-
priate. For example, in §5, Illustration 1, the social value of en-
couraging a young child to learn independence is a factor relevant
to whether a parent may leave the child alone for a short period
of time.
Note: The first paragraph includes the example from Reporter's
Note, p. 62.
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3. Additional language emphasizing that negligence is a spe-
cies of faulty, deficient conduct
In addition to the black letter of §4, include this language in
the commentary, at the end of comment a:
All such standards express the idea that negligence is a type of
fault-i.e, that the actor should have taken a reasonable precau-
tion against the risk of injury.
4. Eliminate "cost-benefit" language
Eliminate the sentence in §4, comment d, stating that the
negligence test "can also be called a 'cost-benefit' test." Such lan-
guage is too closely associated with a narrow economic test of
negligence; yet many jurisdictions support a balancing test of
negligence that is broader.
Alternatively, if such language is retained because a small
number of courts occasionally employ it, clarify that an economic
interpretation is not the only way to understand the Hand for-
mula.
5. Avoid "social utility" language
In emphasizing the need for value judgments, the language
"social value" or "socially recognized" is appropriate. However,
the phrase "social utility" is inapt, for it suggests that a negli-
gence judgment should consider only interests that would be rele-
vant on a utilitarian account. That view is too narrow: it misde-
scribes how many courts actually evaluate the relevant interests,
for utilitarianism is only one of many normative accounts that
courts legitimately employ.
Accordingly, the term "utility" in §4, comment i, p. 52, should
be replaced with the term "value."
6. Encourage courts to articulate the specific values that are
relevant in particular categories of cases.
Emphasize that it is impossible for one simple formula to ex-
press the variety of justifications and values that courts do, and
should, endorse in every negligence context.
Rather, the formula should invite the decisionmaker to ar-
ticulate more specific values in particular cases, keeping in mind
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the fundamental features of a negligence test-an ex ante judg-
ment of fault, considering the foreseeable, marginal advantages
and disadvantages of a precaution. Examples of such category-
specific standards are the doctrines governing medical malprac-
tice, legal malpractice, landowner liability, product liability,
emergencies, learners and beginners, 119 and the responsibilities of
family members to one another. Future development of standards
in additional categories, or more detailed development of stan-
dards in existing categories, is both possible and desirable.
Moreover, although it is true that a jury decision in a negli-
gence case is not precedent for later negligence cases on similar
facts, it is appropriate for judges to develop more detailed stan-
dards in particular categories of cases. To be sure, such standards
should rarely take the form of bright-line rules. However, insofar
as the Draft's §5, comment c, could be viewed as hostile to the de-
velopment of standards rather than rules, that language should
be modified.
The Scope Note at pp. 191-192 could be modified to reflect the
above observations.
7. Encourage courts to identify the proper role of explicit
risk/ benefit analysis by corporations
The passage in §2, comment d (Defining "reckless")120 is a
good start. A cross-reference to this passage in the negligence
commentary (especially comments to §§4-5) would be helpful.
Perhaps courts should further be encouraged to provide more
guidance about the proper role of explicit risk/benefit analysis.
119. See Discussion Draft, supra note 2, § 10 cmt. b, characterizing this as a "somewhat spe-
cial case" and distinguishing between a plaintiff who is teaching the defendant beginner how to
drive and a plaintiff pedestrian injured by such a defendant.
120. See supra note 118.
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